We use consumption and balance sheet data disaggregated between the top 5% and the bottom 95% of US households by income to show that the bottom 95% went deeply into debt to mitigate the impact of their stagnant incomes on their consumption. We use micro data to calibrate an intrinsic Keynesian growth model and show that over a range of plausible parameter values, the rise in US household income inequality increased enough between the early 1980s and 2000s to cause the entire magnitude of the Great Recession and can explain the slow and prolonged recovery.
Economic inequality has risen substantially in many developed economies for several decades. In the US, the primary focus of this article, top income shares began to rise around 1980 after several decades of stability. This trend impacts the future of mature capitalism along multiple dimensions. Perhaps the most obvious of these, and likely the most politically potent, is social justice in an economy that increasingly operates to serve the interests and desires of the affluent. Other concerns arise about social costs imposed by rising tensions among citizens as the economic differences between them expand. This paper focuses on another dimension of rising inequality, its effects on demand generation. Economic models, going back at least to Kalecki (see Hein, 2014 , chapter 5 for a survey and extensive references), have explored the demand drag caused when a greater share of aggregate income accrues to groups that spend a smaller proportion of their income. Empirical evidence that this phenomenon has actually affected modern economies with rising inequality is rather thin, however. In our recent research (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2015a) , we explore this issue in the US context. We conclude that rising inequality did indeed play a central role in the financial dynamics of the household sector that led up to the Great Recession. We argue that historically elevated income inequality helps to explain the remarkably slow recovery of consumer spending since the trough of the Great Recession. These results largely support the implications of models in which upward redistribution slows the economy, as seen in the slow rebound of aggregate output and employment in the US. But a complete historical understanding of these events requires us to link redistribution with the dynamics of the household balance sheet, because household borrowing postponed the full brunt of inequality-induced demand drag for decades prior to the Great Recession.
The discussion to follow puts evidence from our earlier work into a somewhat broader context and extends it in a variety of ways to make the argument that rising income inequality is now a significant barrier to economic growth and full employment in the US economy. Because the US is an important engine of the global economic system, along with the fact that there are parallel phenomena operating in other mature economies, the perspective presented here is also relevant for much of the world outside of US borders.
Demand and Growth Beyond the Short Run
Our interpretation of recent macroeconomic trends in the US household sector follows from a macroeconomic perspective in which growth requires two structural features that evolve separately, at least to an important extent. First is the supply side, the resources and technology that give the economy the potential to produce an expanding volume of goods and services. Rising supply is a necessary condition for growth, at least implicitly, in any macroeconomic theory, mainstream or otherwise. Where we part company with almost all mainstream growth theory is to assert that supply-side growth is not sufficient to realize rising standards of living, and at least an approximation to full employment, because the ability of business to sell its supply-determined potential output is not automatic. What we call the demand generation process is a second structural pillar of growth that has an independent impact on output and employment. A weak demand generation process can keep the economy below its potential output path indefinitely.
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The theoretical perspective that we employ differs from so-called "New Keynesian" theory in which demand shocks affect output and employment in the short run only. Over horizons exceeding a small number of years, real effects of demand shocks in these models converge to zero, typically through the channels of nominal adjustment or enlightened monetary policy. We are skeptical about the effectiveness of these channels. Theoretical and empirical research shows how disinflation and deflation can be destabilizing, especially in modern economies with substantial nominal debt contracts. 2 We doubt that monetary policy can effectively eliminate demand constraints both because of the zero-lower bound for nominal interest rates and the likelihood that attempts to stimulate persistently stagnant demand with low interest rates will create unsustainable borrowing trends that ultimately result in financial instability (see Summers, 2014) . For these reasons, the strength or weakness of the demand generation process can affect the path of the economy beyond the textbook "short run" of mainstream macroeconomic models.
The long-run effects of demand generation on economic growth have been extensively discussed in heterodox macroeconomic research (see Setterfield, 2010 and Lavoie 2014 , chapter 6 for recent contributions with extensive references). But long-run growth paths are almost exclusively supply-driven in mainstream macroeconomics. Nonetheless, recent experience has begun to reveal cracks in the supply-side hegemony of mainstream growth models. In a 2013 address to the IMF, Laurence Summers resurrected the term "secular stagnation" (originally coined by Alvin Hansen). Summers (2014a,b) describes the US economy since the Great Recession as persistently below its potential due to insufficient demand. In our words, this perspective argues that demand generation constrains the economy beyond the short run. Similar ideas have been expressed by prominent economists such as Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz.
1 There are undoubtedly many ways in which the dynamics of the supply side and demand side are linked. For example, a strong demand side leads to higher capacity utilization that stimulates capital formation and R&D which both affect the supply side. Alternatively, technological innovation of a desirable consumer product could stimulate demand growth. Our main point here is that demand generation is independent of the supply side to a large enough extent that demand can constrain output and employment growth below a supply-determined growth path, which should not be interpreted as denying important linkages between supply and demand.
We have come to call this theoretical perspective the intrinsic Keynesian model. We argue that Keynesian demand constraints in mature capitalism are not just temporary deviations from a supply-determined growth path but that Keynesian demand effects can limit output and employment by the very nature of the way that monetary economies operate. It is from this perspective that we explore the implication of rising inequality.
To connect inequality in the distribution of income across households to aggregate demand, we need to analyze the demand forthcoming from the household sector. For those familiar with the US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), this objective suggests that the relevant macroeconomic series is personal consumption expenditures (PCE). But on a deep dive into the definition of PCE we have found major deviations between PCE and the concept of demand from the household sector as household cash expenditure that motivates production and employment. PCE includes an extensive set of items that do not represent household cash expenditure. An example of an imputed expenditure is implicit rent that homeowners who occupy their houses are assumed to pay to themselves. An example of cash expenditure not coming from households is spending on medical care paid for by third parties, typically the government or employer-provided health insurance. In addition, construction of new and renovation of existing owner-occupied homes, a critical source of demand arising from the household sector, is excluded from PCE and combined with business investment instead in the NIPA accounts. In Cynamon and Fazzari (2015b) we document these items, and many more, in detail for the entire household sector. We adjust the NIPA PCE measure to arrive at what we define as adjusted household demand that represents the actual cash spending under the control of the household sector. To the extent that rising household income inequality has macroeconomic effects through intrinsic Keynesian demand channels, it is best captured in the aggregate by this new variable. The gap between the trend in real adjusted household demand and its actual level from 2008 onward represents a huge drag on the US economy, and it is indeed the case that GDP also fell much below the pre-recession trend and remains there as of this writing in early 2015. Of course, a simple trend does not capture subtle structural features of the demand generation dynamics of the US household sector prior to the Great Recession. But it does summarize the household demand growth that was necessary after 2000 to restore the economy to at least an approximation of full employment by 2006.
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Real Adjusted Household Demand Barba and Pivetti 2009, and Kim, 2014 ), but we do not accept the view that the total volume of US household demand was excessive in 2006 and 2007. None of the typical signs of an overheated demand boom were evident. Inflation was tame; interest rates were low; wage growth was slow, even stagnant, over much of the population. The employment-population ratio was rising modestly by the middle 2000s, but it remained well below its early 2000 peak. There is no evidence that the US demand was outstripping supply. We agree with Summers (2014b, page 31) who writes that it "would not be right to say either that growth was spectacular or that the economy was overheating" in the years prior to the Great Recession. Furthermore, Summers clearly explains the distinction between household spending that was financed in an unsustainable way and a total volume of spending that was excessive: "Imagine that US credit standards had been maintained, that housing had not turned into a bubble, and that fiscal and monetary policy had not been stimulative [between 2003 and 2007] . In all likelihood, output growth would have been manifestly inadequate because of an insufficiency of demand." The US economy needed the trend growth of household demand it actually had from 2000 through 2006.
Aggregate evidence supports the view that insufficient demand held the US economy back well after the disastrous collapse of 2008 and 2009. When the severity of the Great Recession became broadly recognized, many forecasters predicted a quick rebound of the economy, citing research that deep recessions are typically followed by strong recoveries. But this was not the case. Annualized growth of real GDP from the trough of the Great Recession in the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2014 (22 quarters) was 2.3%. Following the troughs of much milder recessions in the first quarter of 1991 and the third quarter of 2001, annualized growth for the next 22 quarters was substantially higher, 3.3% and 2.8% respectively. It took 77 months from the beginning of the recession in December, 2007 for the number of jobs (payroll employment) to once again reach the pre-recession level, much longer than in any other postwar recession. The civilian employment-population ratio fell 5.2 percentage points during the recession (from its peak in December, 2006 to a trough in June 2011) but recovered just 1.0 percentage point through December, 2014. We connect this weak performance with a stagnant demand generation process. Why was demand growth so sluggish in this period? The main point of this article is that the answer to this question relies to an important extent on the rise of income inequality in previous decades, ,as we now discuss.
Rising Income Inequality and the US Demand Gap
The dramatic rise of income inequality in the US is well known. In Cynamon and Fazzari (2015a, hereafter referred to as CF) we focus on the income share of the top 5% of the personal income distribution, with income defined before taxes and including realized capital gains. According to the World Top Incomes Database, this share was remarkably stable between 1960 and 1984, fluctuating between 22% and 24%. It began to rise significantly in the early 1980s, reaching 39% by 2009 before receding a bit in the immediate aftermath of the Great Recession to 36%.
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These historical trends could create demand drag for at least two reasons. First, it seems likely that propensities to consume out of after-tax income are lower for highincome households. If more of the economy's income flows into the hands of the affluent, then the average propensity to consume for the economy as a whole will fall. Second, marginal tax rates are higher for higher income groups.
Despite these fairly clear implications of rising inequality for demand generation, a casual look at empirical evidence suggests a problem with the timing of this basic story. When income inequality in the US began to rise around 1980s, the ratio of aggregate household demand to disposable income did not decline. Figure 2 shows the ratio of our adjusted cash flow measures of household demand to disposable income. This ratio was volatile in the 1980s and early 1990s with no clear trend; it stabilized in the late 1990s and early 2000s at a rather high level by historical standards; and it then spiked upward in the last phase of the recent housing boom from 2004 through 2006. What this demand ratio did not do was decline when income inequality began to rise in the early 1980s (the decline evident from 1980 to 1982 was clearly the temporary result of the deep recession that bottomed out in the summer of 1982). It may seem that rising income inequality did not constrain household demand at all if demand as a share of cash income did not decline for decades after income inequality began to rise.
Figure 2 -Household Demand to Disposable Income
In CF we propose that this simple interpretation is misleading because it ignores important financial dynamics of the household sector, dynamics that would ultimately prove unsustainable and trigger the Great Recession. We argue that the demand drag from rising income inequality was postponed in the US economy by massive household borrowing. The rise in the household debt-disposable income ratio is well known. Figure  3 shows that ratio using the new adjusted cash flow income concept and measure of household debt developed in Cynamon and Fazzari (2015b) .
6 After a period of stability from the early 1960s through the 1970s, the debt-income ratio clearly begins to rise around 1980, at roughly the same time that income inequality begins to increase. 6 We adjust the household sector measure of debt from the Flow of Funds Accounts to exclude liabilities of non-profit institutions. 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 Adj. Household Demand / Adj. Disposable Income
Figure 3 -Household Debt to Disposable Income
What kind of evidence can be used to assess the view that rising income inequality played an important role in the run up of debt prior to Great Recession? In CF we show that rising inequality occurred, in part, as the result of a drop of real income growth for the bottom 95 percent of the income distribution. We show that for this group to keep its balance sheet stable under these circumstances it would have had to lower its ratio of spending to income. Furthermore, real interest rates rose substantially around the same time that income inequality began to increase. As emphasized by Mason and Jayadev (2014) , this fact would have required a further reduction in the spending-income ratio to maintain a stable debt-income ratio. Consistent with the aggregate demand rate data in figure 2 above, we present original evidence in CF to show that the demand rate of the bottom 95% did not decline, if anything it increased modestly. The predictable result of slower income growth, higher real interest rates, and a ratio of spending to income that did not decline was a dramatic increase in the debt-income ratio. While that outcome is evident in aggregate data in figure 3, CF further links the leveraging of the household sector to rising inequality by showing that the rise in debt-income was much more severe for the bottom 95% of the income distribution than for the top 5%. Perhaps the most important result from the disaggregated data in CF is difference between what happens to consumption spending across the two income groups that we study once the Great Recession hits. The mainstream life-cycle model of consumer 7 The empirical evidence in CF is based on NIPA measures of personal consumption expenditure and disposable income rather than the adjusted cash flow measures highlighted in this article. This is because the information necessary to disaggregate the adjusted measures is not available. 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 Adj. Household Debt / Adj. Disposable Income behavior predicts that households will try to smooth consumption through a recession, even as income declines. If this model is correct, then the consumption-income ratio should rise in recessions. Indeed, this is what we find in CF for the top 5% group in every recession since the beginning of our disaggregated data series in 1989. The effect is particularly strong in the sharp contraction of income during the Great Recession. But things are quite different for the bottom 95 percent. The consumption-income ratio for this group declines substantially in the Great Recession, from a 2005 peak to a trough in 2010. This outcome is consistent with our interpretation of the way that rising inequality and household borrowing interacted to affect US macroeconomic dynamics in recent years. From the early 1980s until the eve of the Great Recession, the bottom 95% maintained high consumption despite their stagnating incomes, postponing demand drag from rising inequality. The result was an ultimately unsustainable, but persistent, increase in household leverage and financial fragility. When the financial crisis of the Great Recession cuts off the access to new debt for much of the bottom 95%, their consumption spending is forced back onto a lower path. But even though this path is more consistent with the financial circumstances of the bottom 95%, it no longer generates the demand necessary to keep economy near full employment.
The evidence discussed in this section makes a strong case that the consumption gap evident in figure 1 above is to a large extent the result of declining spending by the group of households that received a lower share of income as inequality increased. The demand drag from rising income inequality was deferred for a number of years by massive borrowing by the same group, but that process came to an end with the financial crisis. The consequent demand gap from the bottom 95% has not been offset by the spending from the top 5%, which should not be surprising. Our evidence implies that it was the bottom 95% that were spending unsustainably prior to the Great Recession. There is no reason to think that the top 5% were under-consuming in any sense before 2007. When the debt and spending dynamics of the bottom 95% hit the wall, therefore, there was an insufficient boost in demand from the affluent to offset the shortfall in bottom 95% consumption.
Inequality and Demand in the Aftermath of the Great Recession
As we have discussed, the US recovery from the Great Recession has been disappointing, an outcome that we attribute in large part to the impact of rising income inequality on household demand. Figure 4 provides some support for this interpretation. It shows the profile of real adjusted household demand following each US recession since 1974. Real demand is indexed to 100 in the year preceding the recession and the profiles extend for seven years 8 . In the four cycles prior to the Great Recession, real household demand recovered after seven years to a level that averaged 18% higher than the prerecession peak. But seven years after the peak of the Great Recession, real household demand is just 2% above its 2006 peak. The household sector is not even close to playing its typical role in generating demand in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
Figure 4 -Real Household Demand Profiles from Peak Prior to Each Recession
Let us consider the quantitative effect of rising income inequality as a possible explanation of this recent history by estimating a counterfactual for what household demand might now look like with income shares of the 5% and 95% groups representative of the shares that prevailed before the rise in inequality. We modify the aggregate demand-driven growth model from Fazzari et al. (2013) to account for distributional shifts, an approach consistent with the intrinsic Keynesian theoretical context. In that model, the steady-state growth path at any point in time is given by autonomous demand multiplied by a term that is a dynamic extension of the simple Keynesian multiplier (see equation 3.7). For the purposes here, this multiplier can be approximated by the inverse of one minus the household demand-income ratio.
9 Suppose that there are two income groups, H and L. Denote the marginal propensity to consume also ignores endogenous imports that would reduce the multiplier. The net effect of these two factors is likely small compared with the household demand terms analyzed in the text. The actual path of output need not converge to a steady-state growth path in the model, but in this case the steady-state path provides an approximation to the bottom range of cyclical growth. out of after-tax income for group j as and the marginal tax rate as . Let .be the share of income earned by the high-income group H. The multiplier is:
We can approximate the proportionate effect of income distribution on the level of output, for a given path of autonomous demand, by calibrating this formula and changing the distribution parameter .
The average, and approximately stable, pre-tax income share of the top 5% from the World Top Incomes database (including realized capital gains) was 22.8% from 1960 through 1984 which is our initial value for . This share rose to 38.7% in 2009 before dropping modestly in the years immediately following the Great Recession. We use the average top 5% share from 2008 through 2012 of 36.6% as the final value for . The marginal tax rate for the top 5% ( ), including federal and state income taxes and payroll taxes, is assumed to be 40%. We assume that the bottom 95% tax rate ( ) is 20%. Consider three different settings for the marginal propensities to consume. First, let = 0.4 and = 0.2. These settings represent the effect of temporary income shocks on consumption. The empirical values are consistent with the aggregate evidence presented by Johnson, et al. (2006) for the effect of the 2001 tax rebate on consumption (with the bottom 95% set at the top of the estimated MPC range and the top 5% set at the bottom). With these values, the multiplier M falls 3.7% as the distribution parameter goes from 22.8% to 36.6% (see table 1 ). This decline, which corresponds to a 4% reduction in GDP according to the model, is not trivial. But this calibration of the consumption parameters probably understates the output effects for this kind of counterfactual analysis. That is because the relevant experiment is not a temporary shock to income. Rather, it is a long-run change in the income growth path of the two distributional. In this case, the appropriate consumption propensities are much higher. The average share of after-tax income consumed by the bottom 95% and the top 5% from the data we develop in CF gives = 0.92 and = 0.82. This difference between the two groups is smaller than implied by the temporary propensities used for our first case, but the nonlinear interaction of these parameters with the tax rates and the distribution parameter result in a much bigger effect on the multiplier, a decline of 9.5%. But the differential consumption rates from CF imply a lower difference between the groups than other estimates. For example, in a recent paper, Bakker and Felman (2014) estimate marginal propensities to consume of = 0.95 and = 0.65, and others find even larger differences 10 With the Bakker and Felman estimates, the multiplier declines by 13.6%. Let us put these results into perspective. The distributional shift was not a sudden shock, but a slow process that took place over decades. And any effect on consumption of this shift did not necessarily occur at the same time as the change in distribution: as discussed previously the demand drag from rising inequality was postponed by household sector borrowing. But now that the borrowing binge is over, we argue that the distributional shift is constraining the growth path of household demand. The numerical results show that current output could easily be 10% or more below the demand-led growth path that could prevail if the distribution of income between the bottom 95% and top 5% were at levels consistent with the roughly stable income shares of the 1960s and 1970s. These issues should be studied with a more complete dynamic model that accounts for the interaction of changing income distribution, the run-up of household borrowing, and the end of the borrowing boom. But the first steps presented here show that it is entirely plausible that the magnitude of rising inequality that actually occurred in the US over recent decades is large enough to explain a large shortfall of household demand, like the one apparent in figure 1.
Demand Generation and Economic Democracy
We present the case in this article that the rise of inequality in the personal distribution of income has indeed become a barrier to growth and employment for the US economy. The effect of inequality on demand generation was postponed by massive consumer borrowing for an extended period prior to the Great Recession, but it now is holding back output and employment. The core of our argument is straightforward:
1. The US economy after the Great Recession has recovered slowly because of inadequate demand generation.
2. Demand generation would be stronger if lower income groups received a higher share of total income. 3. The magnitude of this effect could be big enough to explain an output gap of about 10%, if not higher. Figure 5 gives some additional perspective to this argument. It shows an index of real consumption growth for the bottom 95% and top 5% of the income distribution with data drawn from CF. The figure illustrates several features of the analysis presented in this article. The overall impact of inequality is striking. Real consumption of the top 5% grew 77 percentage points more than consumption for the bottom 95% from 1989 to 2012. That is, real consumption growth for the top 5% was more than double that of everyone else. Also, notice that while the cumulative growth of the bottom 95% fell behind that of the top 5% after 1995, the consumption of the bottom group did grow through 2007, despite stagnant incomes for the same group. As discussed previously, the bottom 95% greatly increased their debt-income ratio through 2007 (much more than the top 5%). But when the expanding balance sheets of the bottom 95% hit the wall of the Great Recession and suddenly began to contract, the real consumption growth of this group came to a halt. The 11 Again we note that the CF data are a decomposition of NIPA PCE rather than the adjusted household consumption of the top 5% was also clearly affected by the Great Recession, but the effect was temporary.
The stagnation of bottom 95% consumption growth demonstrates the demand drag we attribute, in large part, to rising income inequality that has finally manifested itself in demand generation after the Great Recession. No doubt, the spending of the affluent is helping to power demand generation in the past few years, and that is an important reason why there is some recovery in the US economy. But the stagnation in the bottom 95%, which still accounted for over 70% of total PCE as of 2012, has opened a large gap in demand generation that has not been filled.
Should the demand generated by the affluent continue its strong upward trend (annualized real growth of 4.9% from 2009 through 2012), it will become more and more important to the health of the economy, a phenomenon already recognized in the popular press, if not academic analysis. 12 Perhaps robust spending of the rich as the engine of demand generation represents a new era for the US, and it may have the potential to close the kind of demand gap shown in figure 1 over the coming years. But this trend will likely exacerbate the social tension of rising economic inequality that is becoming more prominent in US political discourse. 13 The structure of demand generation has become decidedly less democratic in recent years. The price paid in terms of a sluggish recovery from a historic recession is already high. This price will likely rise unless income inequality stabilizes or, better yet, reverses.
